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CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES: WHO SHOULD BEAR THE
COST?
Considerablecontroversy surrounds the budgetary treatment which public uailtiesgive their charitablecontributions. 1fsuch contributionsare regardedas operating expenses, ratepayersbear the cost;ff they are otherwise treated the burden shifts
to the shareholdersof the utility. The authorsurveys the arguments concerningthe
propertreatment ofapublic utility's charitablecontributionsand concludes that the
most equitablerationaleis one that seeks to allocate the burden of cost to those who
benot from the contributions. The Note's analysis continuesfurther and demonstrates that because the beneits of a utility's charitable contributionsflow to both
ratepayerand shareholderalike, the "allor nothing" approach employed by many
courts and commissions stultifies an equitable distribution of costs. Consequently,
the authorproposes an alternative approach which approximates the costs of the
resultantbenefts of charitablecontributionsandallocatesthe costs to both the ratepayers and shareholdersaccordingly.*
INTRODUCTION

public utilities commissions and reviewing courts have had to decide whether a public utility
should be allowed to include its charitable contributions in its operating expenses.' When contributions are treated as operating
expenses, they become part of the cost passed on to the utility's
ratepayers in the form of higher rates.' When operating expense
treatment is not afforded the contributions, they must be borne, in
the form of lower earnings and dividends, by the shareholders of
the utility.3
Although this issue has not been extensively discussed by commentators, those who have addressed the question have generally
determined that charitable contributions of public utilities should
be treated as operating expenses.4 However, the commissions and
RECENTLY, MANY STATE

* The author wishes to express his appreciation to his parents.
1. Blumberg, CorporateResponsibilityandthe Social Crisis, 50 B.U. L. REv. 157, 181
(1970).
2. A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 86 (1969).
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., A. PRIEST, supra note 2, at 83-87; Blumberg, supra note 1, at 181 (discussing contributions with respect to long and short-term profitability); Carpenter, The
Problem of Utility Donations,65 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 289 (1960) (discussing the functions of
donations and their compatibility with other expenses); Contributions in Operating Expenses, 81 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 51 (1968) (discussing the policies behind allowing operating
expense treatment of charitable contributions); Contributionsas an OperatingExpense, 73
PUB. UTIL. FORT. 69 (1964) (discussing the necessary nature of charitable contributions);
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courts which have dealt with the issue have been unable to agree
on the proper treatment to be accorded charitable contributions.
Although a sizeable majority of the commissions has disallowed
operating expense treatment,5 a slight majority of the courts
(which review commission rulings)6 has allowed it.7
There are three primary arguments that have been raised concerning this issue. One argument, which favors treating charitable
contributions as utility operating expenses, is based on the idea
that such contributions are necessary expenses of doing business
in the community in which the utility is located.' Following this
rationale leads to the conclusion that the contributions should be
given treatment similar to other necessary expenses and thus be
included in the rates charged to customers. A second, contrary
argument focuses on the monopolistic nature of utilities and on an
assumption that any charitable contribution which is borne in any
way by an individual should be a matter of personal choice to that
individual. This argument contends that contributions made by
utilities and treated as operating expenses would be an involuntary levy on the ratepayers since the element of personal choice is
absent.9
A third argument, which may support either position, posits
that the party that receives the benefit of the charitable contribution should bear the expense of the contribution. 1o Those favoring
operating expense treatment contend that since ratepayers benefit
through increased charitable services in the community, the ratepayers should bear the cost." l In contrast, those arguing against
such treatment reason that utility shareholders should bear the
cost of contributions since they benefit from an enriched commuContributions by Public Utility Corporationsto CharitableEnterprises,65 PUB. UTIL. FORT.
873 (1960) (discussing the merit of utility contributions in terms of community well-being);
Regulatory Trends, 56 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 830 (1955) (a compilation of cases which address
the treatment of utility charitable contributions).
5. Blumberg, supra note 1, at 181-82.
6. The procedure for review of a commission decision is determined by the relevant
state statute. Provisions vary substantially from state to state, differing as to which parties
may appeal, when an appeal may be undertaken, and whether the posting of a bond is
necessary. See A. PRIEST, supra note 2, at 429-30.
In Ohio, the standard of review is set forth in OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4903.13 (Page
1976). According to this provision, only those orders of the Public Utilities Commission of
Ohio which are unlawful or unreasonable may be reversed. Id.
7. Blumberg, supra note I, at 181-82.
8. See notes 21-40 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 41-71 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 72-105 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 93-100 infra and accompanying text.
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nity and enhanced good will which spawn more customers and
thus greater revenues. t2
This controversy is particularly relevant to Ohio where the
Ohio Supreme Court, in City of Cincinnativ. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio,' 3 held that the Public Utilities Commission of
Ohio (PUCO) "operates reasonably and lawfully when it includes
a utility's reasonable charitable contributions which benefit the
communities in which they are made in its calculation of the utility's operating expenses."' 4 Perhaps in response to this decision,
the Ohio legislature is considering a bill which would preclude a
public utility from including all such contributions as operating

expenses. 15
This Note examines the arguments outlined above, 16 particularly in light of City of Cincinnati and its dissent.' 7 It concludes
that arguments relating to the necessity of contributions or contributions as an involuntary levy are inconclusive and proposes that
the third argument-allocating cost to the party that benefits-is
the most equitable solution.' 8 The Note then proposes that since
neither party benefits to the exclusion of the other, the "all or
nothing" approach taken by courts and commissions to date is unsound. 19 Finally, the Note presents a solution which attempts to
20
correlate the benefits gained with the costs to be shared.
I.

CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS AS NECESSARY EXPENSES

In City of Cincinnati, decisions rendered by PUCO with respect to an application by the Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company
for a rate increase were challenged by the city.2 ' In particular, the
Ohio Supreme Court reviewed the commission's decision to inlude charitable contributions and other expenditures in its
ratemaking formula. 2 As the majority framed the issue, it was
12. See notes 101-04 infra and accompanying text.
13. 55 Ohio St. 2d 168, 378 N.E.2d 729 (1978).
14. Id. at 173, 378 N.E.2d at 733.
15. H.B. 163, 113th General Assembly, § 4909.15 (A)(4) (1979).
16. See text accompanying notes 1-12 supra and notes 21-104 infra and accompanying text.
17. See notes 21-24, 27-29, 40-41, 102 infra and accompanying text.
18. See notes 37-39, 63-105 infra and accompanying text.
19. See note 105 infra and accompanying text.
20. See notes 106-20 infra and accompanying text.
21. 55 Ohio St. 2d at 169, 378 N.E.2d at 731. See note 6 supra.
22. Id. at 171, 378 N.E.2d at 732. The other challenged expenses involved portions of
the company's federal income tax and test-year operating expenses. Id. at 174-75, 378
N.E.2d at 733-34.
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"the city's contention that the commission's inclusion of charitable
contributions in its calculation of operating expenses was unrea23
sonable and unlawful.
In affirming the PUCO decision to include charitable contributions as operating expenses, the court relied in part on the argument that since "[c]orporations have an obligation to the
communities in which they are located and they are expected to
recognize this obligation. . . ,[it follows] that these contributions
have an important relationship to the necessary costs of doing
business."'24 Notably, this position has considerable support.
Other courts and commissions have spoken of the fact that "utilities are fair game for those who solicit contributions on behalf of a
community's charities, '25 and that "public utilities must be good
citizens and the public expects contributions. 2 6
The Ohio court also emphasized the "less than voluntary" nature of utility charitable contributions.27 Specifically, the court
noted that since many charitable organizations depend on corporate donations, 8 and since many charity fundraising activities
may be particularly vigorous, the element of choice normally associated with individual charitable donations was removed. 9
Commentators have generally given approval to operating expense treatment of charitable contributions for such reasons.30 In
addition, some commentators have found contributions to be necessary by reasoning that if operating expense treatment was disallowed, utilities would be put at a disadvantage with other
industries since participation by utilities in good will building activities would be relatively restricted. 3 t Following this reasoning,
a Kansas court concluded that contributions were necessary expenditures because they were essential to maintain the standing
and good will of the utility in the community. 32 The court stated,
"it has not been the policy of this state to penalize any individual
23. Id. at 172, 378 N.E.2d at 732.
24. Id. (quoting In re United Gas Pipe Line Co., 31 F.P.C. 1180, 1189, 54 P.U.R.3d
275, 295 (1964).
25. City of Miami v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 208 So. 2d 249, 258 (Fla. 1968). See
also Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 66 P.U.R.3d 1, 6 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1966).
26. 208 So. 2d at 259.
27. 55 Ohio St. 2d at 172, 378 N.E.2d at 732.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. E.g., A. PRIEST, supranote 2, at 83, 87; Carpenter, supra note 4, at 290. See note 4
supra.

31. See note 30 supra.
32. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 192 Kan. 39, 73, 386 P.2d 515,

19801
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or corporation' 33for assuming reasonable charitable and civic responsibilities.
Facially, these arguments have merit. If contributions are
made to fulfill some obligation or made without choice, they are
necessary expenses and as such should be treated as operating expenses. Yet, this line of reasoning is not necessarily compelling.
For example, one state court3 4 concluded that contributions "are
expenditures which are entirely optional and not compulsory, and
it does not appear that any adverse effect on [the utility's] . . .
revenue would ensure if such contributions and donations were
not made."'35 Accordingly, the utility's charitable contributions
were not allowed as operating expenses.3 6
One commission, which recognized the distinctive nature of
utility operating expenses, has indicated that "the only rational
justification" for passing the cost of contributions along to the
ratepayers "is that they do in fact lead to lower overall costs of
doing business and therefore benefit the ratepayers."3 7 That commission concluded that mere testimony to the effect "that such
contributions are involved in being a good corporate citizen and
they must participate in this sort of activity" is not enough to justify passing the expense along to the ratepayers.3 8
This approach seems preferable for two reasons. First, it
avoids the conclusory aspect of the necessity arguments. The obligatory or binding nature of utility contributions seems to be Musory and thus an improper basis for forcing ratepayers to bear the
costs of such expenses. Second, the approach of forcing ratepayers to pay for only that from which they benefit has a historical
basis in corporation law.39 Although ratepayers could probably
be more smoothly analogized to corporation customers than
545 (1963). See also United Gas Corp. v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 127 So. 2d 404
(Miss. 1961).
33. 192 Kan. at 73, 386 P.2d at 545.
34. Solar Elec. Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 137 Pa. Super. Ct. 325,9 A.2d

447 (1939).
35. Id. at 379, 9 A.2d at 475.
36. Id.at 378-79, 9 A.2d at 475.
37. Southern Union Gas Co., 12 P.U.R.4th 219,230 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975).
The commission ultimately denied application of any contribution to the consumer rate
because the company failed to show that the contributions benefited the utility service community. Id. at 229. For a discussion of benefit as a criterion for contribution treatment, see
notes 72-105 infra and accompanying text.
38. 12 P.U.R.4th at 230.
39. See notes 74-92 infra and accompanying text.
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stockholders, the special nature of utilities as monopolies'
more than make up for any such analytical difficulties.
II.

may

CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS AS AN INVOLUNTARY LEVY

The argument which contends that allowing charitable contributions to be operating expenses amounts to an involuntary levy
on ratepayers is predicated on two concepts-that utilities are monopolies41 and that charitable contributions are a matter of per40. See note 41 infra.
41. In a competitive market, whenever firms in an industry begin to show abnormally
high returns, new firms naturally enter the industry. T. MORGAN, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS 213 (1976). The potential entry of new firms
tends to prevent the prices in any industry from exceeding average cost. Id. This simple
rule of economics prevents a firm in a competitive industry from expending more on charity than "the market will bear."
There are, however, some industries-monopolies-in which "competition is inherently
unavailable or inadequate" to guarantee that prices approximate average costs. A. PRIEST,
supra note 2, at 4. Some monopolies are formed by noncompetitive or anticompetitive
means, while others are "natural monopolies." As one commentator noted:
[c]ertain industries are natural monopolies. This means that a single firm is intrinsically capable of capturing an entire market. These industries are characterized by enormous initial capital investment. Once that investment is made, a
single firm can service an entire market at an average unit cost which will continuously decrease as the firm grows. An established firm therefore has an advantage which effectively forecloses market entry competitors.
Note, Advertising by Public Utilities as an Allowable Expensefor Ratemaking. Assault on
ManagementPrerogative, 13 VAL. U. L. REv. 87, 90 (1978).
Public utilities are considered natural monopolies. In order to protect consumers
against exploitation, to insure that these industries will serve the public interest, and at the
same time to provide public utility companies the necessary assurance of an opportunity to
earn a reasonable return on their investment and to attract capital for expansion, public
utilities are regulated by the state. A. PRIEST, supra note 2, at 1-4.
It has been stated that "[i]t is universally recognized that the goal of ratemaking is to
impose controls which will simulate the results which would have occurred if the firm were
subject to the pressures of competition." Note, supra, at 89. Consequently, regulatory
commissions are responsible for setting allowable rates of return for public utilities. They
do so by approving both expenses and revenues. Id. at 90-91. If the ratesetting is done
correctly, the utility will recover a competitively fair rate of return, and the consumer will
not be "burdened with unnecessary or extravagant costs." Id. at 92.
The typical procedure followed by a regulatory agency when setting rates is explained
in C. PHILLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 136-37 (rev. ed. 1969):
Company X files for a rate increase. The company, with the concurrence of the
commission or its staff, will generally select a "small test period," frequently the
latest 12-month period for which complete data are available. The purposes of
such a test period are as follows. In the first place, the commission must examine
company expenses. Only reasonable expenses are allowed for rate-making purposes. In the second place, the commission must have a basis for estimating future revenue requirements. This estimate is, perhaps, the most difficult problem
in a rate case. A commission is setting rates for the future, but it has only past
experience (expenses, cost, and demand conditions) to use as a guide. Frequently,
future estimates of expenses will be made, thereby resulting in either an increase
or decrease of the test period expenses. But the commissions have been hesitant
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sonal choice.4 2 The argument posits that when utility
management makes a contribution, the ratepayer is not free to object by taking his or her business elsewhere. Consequently, without such recourse the ratepayer is forced to bear charitable
contributions without exercising personal choice.
This argument has considerable support. Justice Locher of the
Ohio Supreme Court cited this reasoning, among others,4 3 in his
dissent in City of Cincinnati. Some commissions relying on that
to make future forecasts of consumer demand, often preferring instead to assume
that the test period demand conditions will hold in the immediate future. For this
reason, the actual rate of return earned by a regulated company may turn out to
be quite different from the rate allowed by the commission in a particular rate
case.

The case will be set down on the commission's docket for public hearings, and
due notice will be given. When the case is called, testimony-sometimes oral and
sometimes written ("canned")-will be presented by the company, the commission's staff, and interveners (interested parties). Such testimony is usually
presented by outside experts, as well as by both company and staff personnel. All
witnesses are sworn, the evidence is recorded, and witnesses may be questioned
by the examiner or commission and cross-examined by counsel for opposing parties. In some instances, hearings will be held in the community or communities
affected. At the federal level, the examiner will then issue his decision (the "initial decision") on the case. The decision must be written and accompanied by
formal findings of fact and conclusions of law. It is then subject to review by the
full commission, and the commission's decision, in turn, may be appealed to the
courts.

Id.
For an explanation of mathematical formulas used in the ratemaking process, see T.
MoRoGA, supra at 219.
42. See Southern New England Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 29 Conn. Supp. 253,
274, 282 A.2d 915, 926 (1970); Connecticut Water Co., 41 P.U.R.3d 152 (Conn. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1961); Hartford Elec. Light Co., 35 P.U.R.3d 64 (Conn. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1960).
43. In reaching his conclusion, Justice Locher also took note of the manner in which
PUCO had previously handled this issue. Initially, PUCO adamantly refused to allow a
utility to treat its charitable contributions as an operating expense. 55 Ohio St. at 180-81,
378 N.E.2d at 737. By 1973, the commission had reversed itself and in some instances
allowed the cost of charitable contributions to be passed on to consumers. Id. In 1973, the
commission, acknowledging that it had not established a clear precedent in this area, allowed a portion of a utility's charitable contributions to be treated as operating expense.
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 3 P.U.R.4th 259,274 (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n 1973). In
doing so, however, the commission clearly indicated its intent to disallow such treatment in
future rate cases. Id. Justice Locher acknowledged that the commission has yet to implement this new rule, but nonetheless felt that "the apt reasoning expressed in other states"
for the disallowance of a utility's charitable contributions as an operating expense, the early
decisions of Ohio, and the "unjustified oscillation" of PUCO on the issue constrained him
to conclude that:
the charitable contributions of a utility, a monopoly with a guaranteed fair rate of
return, should not be involuntarily borne by the consumer, who cannot obtain
this service from another source, but should instead be the responsibility of the
utility's shareholders, who not only control the company but share in its guaranteed profits.
55 Ohio St. 2d at 182, 378 N.E.2d at 737 (Locher, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 177, 378 N.E.2d at 736. Justice Locher wrote:
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rationale have found the following factors to be persuasive: ratepayers get no income tax credit for their contributions;4 5 the contributions are authorized by the managers and directors of the
company, not the ratepayers, and thus the burden of the costs
should be borne by those for whom the managers work, the shareholders;4 6 it is a misrepresentation to the customers, the public,
and the charitable organizations for the utility to contend it has
made charitable contributions when in fact all it has done is to
serve as a funnel through which forced contributions have been
passed from the ratepayer to the charitable organizations.4 7
Many courts similarly have maintained that charitable contributions of a utility, when allowed as an operating expense,
amount to an involuntary levy 48 or assessment on the ratepayer,4 9
and should not be passed on to him in the form of higher rates.
For example, in Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,5 ° the Public Utilities Commission of California,
which had previously allowed public utilities to treat charitable
contributions as operating expenses, reversed itself and announced a new policy to exclude contributions from operating expense for ratemaking purposes.5 1 The California Supreme Court
affirmed the commission's new policy.5 2 The court conceded the
worthiness of the donees and the benefits in good will accruing to
the corporation,53 but found other factors more persuasive.5 4 It
noted that because of the monopolistic nature of the utility, ratepayers who disapproved of various donations and who might have
Dues, donations and contributions if included as an expense for rate making
purposes, become an involuntary levy on ratepayers, who, because of the monopolistic nature of utility service, are unable to obtain service from another source
and thereby avoid such a levy. Ratepayers should be encouraged to contribute
directly to worthy causes and not involuntarily through an allowance in utility
rates. [The utility] . . . should not be permitted to be generous with ratepayers'
money but may use its own funds in any lawful manner.
Id. (quoting Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 62 Cal. 2d 634, 668, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 22, 401 P.2d 353, 374 (1965)).
45. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 20 P.U.R.3d 397, 406 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1957).
46. General Tel. Co. of Mich., 41 P.U.R.3d 469,472 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1961).
47. United Fuel Gas Co., 35 P.U.R.3d 353, 364-65 (W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1960).
48. See Davenport Water Co. v. Iowa St. Comm'n, 190 N.W.2d 583, 608 (Iowa 1971);
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Md. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Md., 230 Md. 395, 414,
187 A.2d 475, 485 (1963).
49. See Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 55 Ill. 2d 461, 481, 303
N.E.2d 364, 375 (1973).
50. 62 Cal. 2d 634, 44 Cal. Rptr. 1, 401 P.2d 353 (1965).
51. Id. at 668, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 22, 401 P.2d at 374.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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5
wanted to obtain service from another source could not do so.
Therefore, contributions which should have been a matter of free
choice became an involuntary levy.56 The majority also rejected
the argument that if corporations, including public utilities, did
not contribute to charities, many of the donees might otherwise
require and receive support from government and thus necessitate
increased taxes. 5 7 The majority simply stated that the public util-

ity "is not authorized to exact from its customers payments in lieu
of taxes." 58
In 1934, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma denied operating ex-

pense treatment for a utility's charitable contributions in Carey v.
Corporation Commission of Oklahoma.59 The court acknowl-

edged that donations are a matter for the discretion of corporate
management, 60 and analogized a public corporation to an individ-

ual who, once he has made a decision to support a public charity,
should not expect his employer to increase his compensation accordingly.6 1 A corporation, like an individual, should be allowed
to contribute to charity, but then should62 not "be allowed to increase its earnings to take care thereof."

Although these arguments also have facial validity, an examination of the underlying concepts shows serious flaws. While it is
true that in the nonregulated, nonmonopolistic industries the consumer generally has a choice of sources from which to purchase
his goods and services, it is unlikely that a consideration of a par-

ticular firm's choices regarding charitable contributions is consciously a part of a consumer's purchasing decisions. It seems
probable that when purchasing goods or services in a nonregu55. Id.

56. That theme was enlarged upon by the concurring justice who wrote:
Corporations are permitted to "make donations. . .

."

A dissatisfied stockholder

may seek to change the policies of a corporation, defeat the directors, or sell his
stock investment. No comparable alternatives are available to a monopoly ratepayer, whose only choice is to pay the full bill sent to him-for services rendered
and gifts made in the name of the company-or abandon the use ofhis telephone.
The unfairness is manifest.
Id. at 677, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 27, 401 P.2d at 379 (Mosk, J., concurring).
57. The dissent argued that "as a pure business proposition, it is more economical for
a public corporation to support private charities than it would be if the corporation had to
pay increased taxes to support government-operated activities." Id.at 680, 44 Cal. Rptr. at
29, 401 P.2d at 381 (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting).
58. Id. at 669, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 22, 401 P.2d at 374.
59. 168 Okla. 487, 33 P.2d 788 (1934).
60. Id. at 492, 33 P.2d at 794.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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lated industry, consumers are not consciously aware of, or even
interested in a corporation's record of charitable contributions. A
consumer's option to boycott a firm which has made inappropriate
charitable contributions seems more theoretical than actual.
Therefore, an argument based upon the proposition that the passage of contributions on to the ratepayer amounts to an involuntary levy is not necessarily compelling.
Viewed in another light, the decisions concerning which types
of charitable activities the public should be required to support
are generally made by elected governmental officials. To allow a
utility to make charitable contributions and then pass them on
may indeed be viewed as an imposition of an unvoted tax. 3
While it can be argued that most of the donee charities would
receive tax support if the contributions were not forthcoming,'
and that both consumers and utilities would be required to pay
more in taxes than they would have in contributions, 65 it is probably also true that, if left to the public through its representatives,
some of the charitable organizations and activities might indeed
not be funded by tax dollars. Still, it might reasonably be assumed that utility managers and directors are not going to make
contributions that would be ill-received by the public. "Improper" contributions would come to the attention of the public,
instigate public resentment, and cause the managers, directors,
and the utility embarrassment. 6 6 In addition, the utility's charitable contributions are subject to scrutiny by the ratemaking commission,6 7 the members of which are generally either elected or
appointed by elected officials. 68 Thus, the public may have some
control over the nature and amount of contributions. As a result,
the fact that ratepayers are unable to exercise personal choice re63. Such a "tax" would quite likely be regressive. See Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 62 Cal. 2d 634, 44 Cal. Rptr. 1, 401 P.2d 353 (1965).
64. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
65. Carpenter, supra note 4, at 290-92. According to Carpenter, nearly one hundred
percent of every dollar collected by a utility for charity goes to charity. The government
must collect two dollars in taxes to give one dollar to health or educational activity. Id. at
300.
Carpenter also contends that corporate giving is much better in general than mass fund
raising efforts because the latter involves high fund raising costs and consigns the field to
highly professional personnel, public relations, and merchandising techniques, while the
former involves low fund raising costs and can be based on real need. Id. at 292.
66. Cf. The Plain Dealer, August 18, 1978, at 2-A, col. 1.
67. See note 6 supra.

68. F.
1968).
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(rev. ed.

CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS

garding the contributions made by utilities does not seem to be the
cause for concern which some courts and commissions suggest.

In addition, while including a utility's contributions as an operating expense would increase the rates, it would probably increase them by only a relatively small amount.6 9 For example, in
Vrtjak v. IllinoisBell Telephone Company, 0 it was calculated that
a contribution of $310,000, spread over the utility's approximately
two million telephones in the Chicago area, amounted to an annual charge on each telephone of about sixteen cents. Taking into
consideration the income tax effect, the charge amounted to about
eight cents.7 1

Consequently, since neither arguments based on the necessary
nature of charitable contributions nor the arguments concerning
the involuntary burden thrust on ratepayers when operating expense charitable contributions are treated as operating expenses

may be found to be absolutely compelling, other arguments
should be examined.
III.

THE BENEFIT CONTROVERSY

A third rationale, based upon the simple notion that he who
benefits from an expenditure should bear the cost, may provide a
more persuasive approach to the issue of how a utility's charitable
contributions should be treated. The idea of justifying charitable
contributions through some accrued benefit has a solid basis in
corporation law. A discussion of the development of this concept
in corporation law7 2 and its application to utilities73 follows.

A.

Charitable Contributionsof NonregulatedCorporations

Philanthropy has not always been considered an appropriate

corporate activity. Believing that profit maximization was the
only proper motive for most corporations, early judicial decisions
regarding the power of corporations to make charitable contribu69. Including the cost in the rate calculation ostensibly produces only "a minor
change in the second decimal place in the average rate." Carpenter, supra note 4, at 298.
See also In re United Gas Pipe Line Co., 31 F.P.C. 1180, 54 P.U.R.3d 385 (1964).
70. 32 P.U.R.3d 385 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1959).
71. Taking the tax effect into account in such a manner seems to offer at least a partial
rejoinder to the argument of those who contend that the ratepayer may get no tax advantage. See note 45 supra. While the individual does not directly get the tax benefit, the tax
savings that would be gained by the utility through contribution deductions would conceivably be passed on to the ratepayer.
72. See notes 74-92 infra and accompanying text.
73. See notes 93-105 infra and accompanying text.
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tions in the absence of express charter authorization were based
primarily on a consideration of whether the contribution "was not
in fact altruistic but was intended to produce a reasonably direct
financial benefit to the corporation, and therefore could be regarded as incidental to the powers contained in the corporate
74
charter."
As early as the 1930's, however, recognition of the responsibilities of corporate directors had changed enough to prompt one
commentator to suggest that "a sense of social responsibility toward employees, consumers, and the general public may thus
come to be regarded as the appropriate attitude to be adopted by
those who are engaged in business. '75 To accommodate that shift
in public perception of the role of corporations, the early standard
of reasonably direct benefit was eased.76 Legislatures also began
to confirm corporate power to make charitable contributions by
passing statutes to accommodate such activity. In 1936, Congress
amended the Internal Revenue Code to allow corporations to deduct charitable, scientific, and educational contributions up to five
percent of their taxable incomes. 77 By 1948 fifteen states had expressly authorized corporate philanthropic contributions.78
In 1953 the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided a landmark
79
case on the issue. In A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow,
the court upheld a $1,500 corporate donation to Princeton University, and in so doing significantly altered the earlier "direct benefit" test by considering the corporation's social responsibility to
higher education.
The Smith court upheld the validity of the contribution on
three alternative grounds. First, since the existence of the free enterprise system depends in large part on an educated populace, the
74. Blumberg, supra note 1, at 167. A classic statement of the rule was made by the
court in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919). After reaffirming
the prevailing view that "a business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for
the benefit of the stockholders," id. at 507, 170 N.W. at 684, the court declared:
The difference between an incidental humanitarian expenditure of corporate
funds for the benefit of the employees, like the building of a hospital for their use
and the employment of agencies for the betterment of their condition, and a general purpose and plan to benefit mankind at the expense of others is obvious.
Id. at 506-07, 170 N.W. at 684.
75. Dodd, For Whom are CorporateManagers Trustees?,45 HARv. L. REv. 1145, 1160
(1932).
76. Blumberg, supra note 1, at 167, n.53.
77. Act of June 22, 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-740,49 Stat. 1661 (1936) (now I.R.C. § 170).
78. Blumberg, supra note 1, at 167.
79. 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581, appeal dismissed,346 U.S. 861 (1953).
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expenditures could "readily be justified as being for the benefit of
the corporation: indeed, if need be the matter may be viewed
strictly in terms of actual survival of the corporation in a free enterprise system."' 80 Therefore, even under the old benefit test the
contribution could be justified. Second, a New Jersey statute, enacted in 1930 and applicable to corporations formed before then,
specifically authorized corporate contributions. 81 Third, the court
found that
modem conditions require that corporations acknowledge and
discharge social as well as private responsibilities as members
of the communities within which they operate. Within this
broad concept there is no difficulty in sustaining, as incidental
to their proper objects [sic] and in aid of the public welfare, the
power of corporations to contribute corporate funds82within reasonable limits in support of academic institutions.
The Smith court apparently did not, however, mean to suggest
that it would approve the making of a corporate charitable contribution which could not reasonably be anticipated to benefit the
corporation in some manner, for it concluded by finding that the
cbntribution with which it was dealing had been made "voluntarily in the reasonable belief that it would aid the public welfare
and advance the interests of the plaintiff corporation as a private
' 83
corporation and as part of the community in which it operates.
Cases following Smith adhere to the requirement that, although the strict direct benefit test need not be met, those seeking
to sustain the contribution should show that it will in some way
help fulfill corporate objectives.8 4 In considering that requirement, one court went so far as to suggest that it was inconceivable
that managers would donate if they could not see at least some
future benefit.8 5
While the old direct and immediate benefit test is no longer
followed, contributions must still promise benefit to the corpora80. Id. at 154, 98 A.2d at 586.
81. Id. at 155, 98 A.2d at 586-87.
82. Id. at 154, 98 A.2d at 586.
83. Id. at 161, 98 A.2d at 590.
84. Blumberg, supra note 1, at 175, n.109.
85. Union Pac. R.R. v. Trustees, Inc., 8 Utah 2d 101, 106, 329 P.2d 398, 401 (1958).
Present business justifications for corporate social involvement generally envision such
benefit to the corporation. Some of the justifications advanced are:
1) Involvement in the community will help develop markets and customers, and thus
produce both short-term and long-term profits. David Rockefeller has said that "Today
there is a growing realization that management is not doing the job it should for the stockholders simply by earning as large a profit as it can this year, unless at the same time it is
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tion.8 6 As one commentator has said:
The validity of corporate activity is believed to rest on the business orientation of the program and the existence of a reasonable relation between the program and the long-term objectives
of the business, or simply put, whether the activity is being reasonably undertaken as "good business" in the climate of the
times.
As long as such a reasonable relationship exists, a8 corporations
may make charitable contributions.8 9 Almost all public utilities
are corporations, and their legal authority to make such contributions is similarly well settled.9" Therefore, there is little doubt that
helping to shape an environment in which the business can continue earning a profit four
or five or ten years from now." Blumberg, supra note 1, at 163-64.
2) Deriving its existence and sustenance from a community, the corporation has a moral
obligation to support it. Id.
3) Social involvement helps "develop good will, obtain favorable national attention and
foster improved investor recognition." Id.
4) Business, like other elements of society, must join in the solution of community
problems. A response by business may be deemed essential to prevent governmental preemption of further areas in the free enterprise system. Id.
5) Business is in large part responsible for community problems and must work to solve
them in order to avoid adverse public and governmental reaction. Id.
Since 1948, and particularly since Smith, almost all of the remaining states have enacted laws expressly empowering corporations to make charitable contributions. The
MBCA has served as a model for close to thirty states. Section 4(m), adopted in whole or
modified form by those jurisdictions, provides that each corporation shall have power "[t]o
make donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational purposes."
ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 4(m) (1969).
86. Blumberg, supra note 1, at 176.
Even if corporate power exists, it may still only be exercised in the interests of the
corporation; there must be a reasonable relationship between the activity and the
fulfillment of the objectives of the business. Contributions to a "pet charity" unrelated to the business would be subject to attack by minority shareholders.
Id.
87. Id. at 206.
88. See note 85 supra.
89. There are, however, those who strongly believe corporations should not have that
right. For example, Milton Friedman writes:
Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free
society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than
to make as much money for their stockholders as possible. This is a fundamentally subversive doctrine. If businessmen do have a social responsibility other
than making maximum profits for stockholders, how are they to know what it is?
Can self-selected private individuals decide what the social interest is? Can they
decide how great a burden they are justified in placing on themselves or their
stockholders to serve that social interest? Is it tolerable that these public functions
of taxation, expenditure, and control be exercised by the people who happen at
the moment to be in charge of particular enterprises, chosen for their posts by
strictly private groups? If businessmen are civil servants rather than the employees of their stockholders then in a democracy they could sooner or later, be chosen by the public techniques of election and appointment.
M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133-34 (1962).

90. One commentator noted:
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public utilities, in their corporate capacity, have the power and the
right to make charitable contributions.
The cost of contributions by corporations that are not public
utilities is generally passed on to the consumer in the form of
higher prices. 9 But, in contrast to the general corporation, the

regulated public utility occupies a unique position in the marketplace.92 That position may or may not make it appropriate for
public utility contributions to receive different treatment than that
afforded corporate contributions in general.
B.

Charitable Contributionsof Regulated Corporations

The concept of benefit has been employed by many courts,
commissions, and commentators in determining the proper treat-

ment of a utility's contributions. A direct benefit test, similar to
that used in early judicial decisions regarding the validity of non-

public utility corporations' charitable contributions,

93

is applied

by many commissions. For example, the Michigan Public Service
Commission, which normally refuses to allow the treatment of
contributions as operating expenses, has allowed such treatment
where it has been shown that the efforts supported by the contri-

butions were extremely beneficial to the utility's entire service
area.94 In two particular cases, the contributions made by public
utilities serving Detroit went to programs working to rehabilitate
In most states, corporations. . . are now authorized to make donations for the
public welfare or for charitable, scientific, or educational purposes. There is,
therefore, little question as to the corporate power of a utility to join other business enterprises in what have come to be orthodox contributions to a variety of
beneficiaries.
A. PRIEST, supra note 2, at 83 (citations omitted).
Only a very few decisions have not assumed the validity of such expenditures as a
matter of corporate power. See, e.g., Accounting of the N.Y. TeL Co., 188 I.C.C. 83, 95
(1932); New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 12 N.J. 568, 595-97, 97 A.2d
602, 615-16 (1953).
91. One commission stated, "There is no question that unregulated businesses treat
these costs as ordinary business expenses which are reflected in the price of goods and
services." Kansas City Power & Light Co., 8 P.U.R.3d 490, 500 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1955).
The existence of a perfectly functioning competitive market would probably preclude
this from happening, for prices could not be raised above a market equilibrium price to
cover the cost. However, few markets function so perfectly, and so the contributions generally do become a part of the price, rather than a deduction from profits. See generally, D.
VAGTS, BAsIc CORPORATION LAW 122 (1979).

92. See note 41 supra.
93. See notes 72-92 supra and accompanying text.
94. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 85 P.U.R.3d 467, 485 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970);
The Detroit Edison Co., 83 P.U.R.3d 463, 488 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970).
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the city after its riots. The commission concluded that, in addition
to helping reverse the trend of urban deterioration, the contributions could ultimately lead to "the reduction of threats to employees going to and from the company's headquarters to their
residences [which] is essential to continual and efficient high-quality and improved service."9 5
The benefit test has been modified by commissions in some
instances. Rather than requiring direct benefit to the contributing
corporation, some commissions will accept any benefit to the com96
munities in which the contributions are made.
Similarly, some courts, while allowing a certain charitable
contribution to be treated as an operating expense, have required
a showing "that it is productive of good community relations
which will benefit the utility or its patrons." 97 Many courts will
allow as operating expenses only those contributions which are
reasonable in amount and given to recognized and "appropriate"
charities. 98 Others will allow them only where they have "an effect upon the creation of the service or product of the corporation
and therefore may be considered as reasonably necessary in the
rendition of service to the consumer." 99
In addition, some courts have allowed operating expense treatment for charitable contributions on the theory that they are like
advertising or development expense because they "foster normal
growth" and allow "consumers [to] benefit from increased de'
mand in the form of decreased unit cost of service." Go
95. 85 P.U.R.3d at 485. See also Vrtjak v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 32 P.U.R.3d 385 (Ill.
Commerce Comm'n 1959) which held that "there are different benefits of varying character
flowing to a utility from proper support of worthy philanthropic objectives" which would
meet the test "that donations are not a proper operating expense unless it is shown that they
will be of some peculiar benefit to the company or its ratepayers." Id. at 388.
96. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 15 P.U.R.4th 344, 362 (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n 1976).
97. United Transit Co. v. Nunes, 99 R.I. 504, 513-14, 209 A.2d 215, 222 (1965).
98. City of Miami v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 208 So. 2d 248, 259 (Fla. 1968). The
court in Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 192 Kan. 39, 386 P.2d 515
(1963), indicated that the contributions must be "subject to strict scrutiny by the Commission as to their reasonableness and propriety." Id. at 73, 386 P.2d at 545.
99. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 12 N.J. 568, 596, 97 A.2d
602, 616 (1953).
100. Public Serv. Co. of N.J. v. New Hampshire, 102 N.H. 150, 160, 153 A.2d 801, 808
(1959).
One court indicated that it did not feel compelled to consider such things as social
responsibility, or the furtherance of the company's own purposes in promotion of public
relations, good will, or community acceptance. Rather, it held that charitable "contributions are vital to establish and improve public relations. It is considered much the same as
advertising." New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 360 Mass. 443,
489, 275 N.E.2d 493, 521 (1971).
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Not all commissions and courts agree that a utility's charitable
contributions should be considered operating expenses under the
benefit rationale."0 ' Justice Locher in his City of Cincinnati dissent is typical of those who use the benefit rationale to prohibit
operating expense treatment. He reasoned that while charitable
contributions made in a local service area benefit the communities
served, they nonetheless are made at management discretion, tend
to upgrade the utility's public image, and inure more to the benefit
of the utility and its stockholders than to the benefit of the ratepayers. Therefore, Justice Locher concluded, the contributions
should be borne by the stockholders and not the ratepayers.102
Such an argument has merit. If the ratepayers benefit from the
contributions in the form of a better place in which to live and
work, so too must the corporation and its shareholders benefit. It
is quite probable that a community in which efforts succeed in
making it more stable and attractive is likely to retain current residents and attract new ones-all of whom represent potential new
subscribers to the utility's products and services. A growing customer base is generally a boon to any corporation and helps assure the continued value of the shareholders' investment.
Similarly, other benefits, such as lower finance costs and decreased vandalism,10 3 would accrue to ratepayers, shareholders,
and the company alike. While ratepayers can expect lower costs,
shareholders and the company can expect a more valuable and
more easily transferable investment.104
Clearly, all parties which could ultimately bear the cost of utility contributions benefit by them. Thus, any approach which
places the burden on one group to the exclusion of the other ignores the only persuasive rationale for allocating such burdens-those who benefit should bear the burden. The Supreme
Court of Ohio and the other jurisdictions adopting reasoning similar to that expressed by the majority in City of Cincinnati have
101. E.g., United Gas Pipeline Co., 31 F.P.C. 1180, 54 P.U.R.3d 275, 295 n.10 (1964),
where the author of an opinion which ultimately held that charitable contributions were an
operating expense, took exception in a footnote stating that charitable contributions "bear

no relationship whatsoever to the necessary costs of providing utility service." Id.
102. 55 Ohio St. 2d at 183, 378 N.E.2d at 736 (citing Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.,
96 P.U.R.3d 321 (Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1972) and Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of
W. Va., 22 P.U.R.4th 107 (W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1977)). See Kansas City Power &
Light Co., 8 P.U.R.3d 490, 500 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1955).
103. See Detroit Edison Co., 83 P.U.R.3d 463 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970); Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 85 P.U.R.3d 467 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970). See notes 94-95
supra and accompanying text.
104. See D. VAoTs, BAsIc CORPORATION LAW 122 (1979).
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ignored the inequities which result when the ratepayers are forced
to shoulder the entire burden of charitable contributions in the
form of higher rates. Similarly, the Ohio legislature, in considering statutory provisions which would preclude a utility ffom passing any such costs on to the ratepayers, 10 5 ignores the fact that
ratepayers, too, are beneficiaries of the contributions.
Thus, in seeking to remain consistent with the benefit rationale, the best approach is to allocate the cost of the contributions
among those who benefit from them in proportion to the relative
benefit accrued. A discussion of one possible approach that attempts to achieve such an end follows.

IV.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

Courts and commissions have faced a dilemma similar to the
charitable contribution problem in analyzing the treatment of utility advertising expenditures. Using a benefit rationale, 10 6 expenses for advertising aimed at the promotion or retention of
service or the dissemination of information have been allowed to
be treated as operating expenses. 0 7 Other types of advertising,
directed at promoting good will (called institutional advertising)
have not been accorded unanimous treatment. 0 8 This controversy closely parallels the issue of the treatment of a utility's charitable contributions.
Those who have favored operating expense treatment of institutional advertising costs have employed many arguments, all of
which contend that the ultimate benefit accrues to the ratepayer.
For example, some commissions and commentators have reasoned that institutional advertising benefits consumers by helping
to attract investment capital and market the utility's securities,
thus resulting in savings in the cost of financing which can be
passed on to ratepayers. Further, these commissions and commentators contend that advertising, by helping to recruit employ105. See note 15 supra.
106. See, e.g., Arkansas Power & Light Co., 15 P.U.R.4th 153 (Ark. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1976) (where the commission required that "the ratepayer should only be charged
with those expenses which are of direct benefit to the ratepayer." Id. at 176.
107. See, e.g., Arkansas Power & Light Co., 15 P.U.R.4th 153, 176 (Ark. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1976); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 55 Ill. 2d 461, 479, 303
N.E.2d 364, 374 (1973); Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 96 P.U.R.3d 1, 20 (Iowa St. Commerce
Comnm'n 1972); Southern Union Gas Co., 12 P.U.R.4th 219, 232 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1975). See generally Note, Public Utilities: The Allowance of Advertising Expendituresfor
Ratemaking Purposes-Is This Trip Necessary?, 29 OKLA. L. REv. 202, 209-10 (1976).
108. See notes 109-11 infra and accompanying text.
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ees and reduce the cost of answering customers' complaints and
questions, reduces negative attitudes towards the utility and also
leads to fewer losses in areas such as "theft of utility service, bad
debts and vandalism." 9 Others have found that such advertising
was "not only desirable, but obligatory," based on a belief that a
firm should "maintain a contact with the economic and social life
of the area it serves."" 0
There have been other courts and commissions, however,
which have disallowed institutional advertising as an operating
expense "on the basis that it serves only the interests of the stockholders and is of no benefit to the ratepayer."' 1 1
Yet, as with charitable contributions, it seems clear that both
ratepayer and shareholder benefit from good will advertising.
Several commissions have noted this phenomenon. For example,
the New York Public Service Commission noted that institutional
advertising is:
designed to project a favorable image to customers, shareholders and investors. To the extent such advertising fosters sound
consumer relations or encourages people to invest in the company, it seems clear that the consumers, as well as the shareholders, are ultimately benefited
through the lessening of the
12
expense of doing business.'
In addition, the Iowa Commerce Commission concluded that:
"Institutional advertising by its very definition is designed to improve the image of the company. It should be noted, however,
that a sizeable amount of those advertisements also provide a beneficial service to the ratepayer."1 13 More importantly, however,
this commission, while acknowledging a present inability to make
an accurate allocation of the advertising expense between good
will and consumer benefits, chose to "allow the expense of institutional advertising4 to be shared equally between the company and
11
the ratepayer."
109. Note, supra note 41, at 116.
110. Id. at 114.
Ill. Id. at 115. Cf New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 300

Mass. 443, 275 N.E.2d 493 (1971) where the court held that managers could decide if institutional advertising is helpful to a business, and if so, how much the firm could spend. The
court noted that as long as the cost was reasonable, it should be borne by the ratepayers.
Id. at 518.
112. Consolidated Edison of N.Y., Inc., 41 P.U.R.3d 305, 364 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1961).
113. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., 2 P.U.RAth 288, 294-95 (Iowa St. Commerce
Comm'n 1973).
114. Id. at 294.
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Perhaps for now, or at least until an advanced econometric
model can be devised to allocate the cost more accurately, 115 such
a method should be employed regarding charitable contributions.6
The simplicity and apparent fairness of the plan are appealing.'t
At least one commission has recently employed just'such a
method."17

Along with a cost-splitting method, a legislatively imposed
maximum,118 and legislatively suggested guidelines for the type of
charities considered appropriate objects of a public utility's contributions, would settle many of the concerns expressed by both the
majority and the minority in City of Cincinnati. The concept of a
legislative ceiling on contribution costs which may be passed on to
ratepayers has three appealing aspects. First, such a maximum
might better approximate the benefit of contributions which accrues to the ratepayer. Second, establishing an amount, which the
legislature permits the ratepayer to bear, legitimizes the expenses
and avoids attack on the ground that such amounts are an involuntary levy. Finally, by setting such a ceiling, the legislature establishes a more efficient tax structure for charitable purposes.19
A legislative decision regarding the appropriate types of charities is also meritorious. Such guidelines would serve to limit the
type of contributions borne by the ratepayers to those which will
likely bestow some benefit upon them. For example, the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. has contributed over two million
dollars to charitable, civic, and educational institutions in the last
115. Note that this Note merely assumes that no model exists. If one did exist, allocation of costs consistent with the model would be preferable.
116. The benefit to charities is also apparent. If the entire cost of a utility's contributions had to be borne by shareholders, and if those contributions were sufficiently large
enough to have a significant effect on the shareholders' effective rate of return, the utility's
stock would become less desirable. To counter this, the utility would be forced to reduce or
eliminate its contributions. Spreading the cost of the contributions between consumers and
shareholders should make the effect on both groups negligible.
117. The Lincoln Tel. & Tel. Co., 12 P.U.R.4th 79, 83 (Neb. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975).
118. See Re Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 15 P.U.R.4th 344, 362 (1976).
In City of Cincinnati v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, the Ohio Supreme Court
referred to the .10 percent of gross operating revenues apparently adopted as a guideline by
the PUCO, and allowed .11 percent. 55 Ohio St. 2d 173 n.3, 378 N.E.2d at 733 n.3 (1978).
As an alternative to the "straight" cost-splitting method, once a utility has determined,
through the "legislatively imposed maximum and cost-splitting" method, the maximum
amount of contributions which it could pass on to its ratepayers, the utility could be allowed to impose upon its shareholders as much additional "charitable burden" as the
shareholders would permit.
Regardless of which variation is used, the tax benefit effect of the contributions should
always be considered when rates are being set. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
119. See note 65 supra.
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five years. All of these donations came out of revenues collected
from the utility's ratepayers. While Greater Cleveland institutions
were the recipients of the bulk of the contributions, large sums of
money were distributed outside of the service area. 120 Under
proper guidelines, the utility would be able to pass onto its ratepayers only the cost of those contributions which were distributed
within the service area or which could be shown to have benefited
the ratepayers in some way.
Further, lists of "approved charities," along the lines of the tax
exempt charities list of the Internal Revenue Code, should be provided by state legislatures to serve as guidelines for utilities and
utilities commissions.
V.

CONCLUSION

Neither forcing ratepayers to bear the entire cost of contributions, nor precluding a utility from passing such costs on to the
ratepayers is an adequate resolution of the problems raised when
considering the proper treatment of a utility's charitable contributions.1 2 1 While a sophisticated econometric model which can
identify and apportion the costs and benefits of various-contributions has yet to be devised,' 2 2 it is not beyond the capabilities of a
legislature to establish guidelines which would, at least in part,
achieve those objectives.
Clearly there are inequities in allowing a public utility to pass
on to its ratepayers the entire cost of its charitable contributions.
Similarly, problems would result from passage of the proposed
Ohio legislation which would prohibit a utility from passing on
any of that cost. The former fails to apportion the true costs and
benefits of charitable contributions in an equitable fashion; the
latter fails to consider the very real value of charities to a community and its residents, and the need of those charities for contributions.

A serious evaluation of the issue by the Ohio legislature, a reasoned weighing of the relevant policy considerations, and adoption of the recommendations contained in this Note should result
in a more equitable and workable solution to the problems raised,
120. The Plain Dealer, August 18, 1978, at 2-A, col. 1.
121. See note 105 supra.
122. See note 115 supra.
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but not resolved, in City of Cincinnati v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio.
PETER M. SIKORA

